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COMMENTS 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - DuE PROCESS AND RIGHT OF CON-
FRONTATION - JENCKS AcT - The Jencks Act1 like the rule it 
purportedly reaffirmed, was designed to insure "justice."2 Al-
though the stated purpose of the act was to preserve the rights 
of any defendant under due process of law, the question remains 
unresolved whether, in articulating the rule in terms of "justice," 
the Court in Jencks v. United States3 incorporated it into the re-
quirements of due process. To be sure, the underlying intent of 
both the Court and Congress is unclear, but of far more concern 
than the intent is whether the Jencks Act, in fact, violates the 
constitutional mandates of the Fifth4 and Sixth5 Amendments, 
even if the Jencks case itself was not based on constitutional 
grounds. 
The Court in Jencks clarified four procedural matters deal-
ing with a defendant's right to inspect extra-judicial statements 
made by government witnesses to government agents: (1) de-
fendant is not required to establish a foundation of inconsistency 
in order to inspect prior statements of witnesses; (2) whereas in-
spection of prior statements had formerly rested in the trial court's 
discretion, the Jencks decision indicates that defendant is entitled 
to inspect them as a matter of right; (3) the Court specifically 
disapproved of the procedure whereby the requested documents 
are submitted to the trial judge for his determination of relevancy 
and materiality; (4) the Court ruled that a refusal by the gov-
ernment to comply with an order for production must result in 
118 U.S.C. (1958) §3500. The full text of the statute is set out in the appendix infra. 
2 See S. Rep. 981, 85th Cong., 1st sess., p. 1862 (1957). 
s 353 U.S. 657 (1957). Petitioner, a labor union official, had been convicted of making 
false statements in a noncommunist affidavit filed pursuant to §9 (h} of the Taft-Hartley 
Act. At the trial, two crucial government witnesses, both of whom were Communist Party 
members, admitted making prior statements to the F. B. I. concerning activities of petitioner 
about which they testified. Petitioner's counsel moved for production of these statements 
for examination by the trial judge in camera, and delivery to the counsel of those por-
tions found to be admissible for impeachment purposes. The motion was denied, and the 
court of appeals affirmed on the ground that no foundation of inconsistency had been 
laid. The Supreme Court reversed, finding the previous practice of requiring the defendant 
to lay a preliminary foundation of inconsistency between the contents of the report and 
the testimony before being entitled to inspect such reports to be in error. In addition, 
the Court disapproved the accepted practice of an in camera examination by the trial 
judge to determine relevancy and materiality. The dissent, on the other hand, declared 
that unless Congress immediately changed the rule announced by the Court, agencies of 
the federal government engaged in law enforcement might as well close up shop, for the 
majority opinion has opened their files to the criminal. 
4 U.S. CoNST., Amend. V. 
5 U.S. CoNST., Amend. VI. 
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a dismissal. As to (I) and (2), the act embodies the Court's 
holding. With respect to (3) and (4), the act appears to limit 
the holding; this will be discussed later in this comment. 
It is indisputable that the Jencks case did, both in fact and in 
effect, make sweeping changes in the development of rules ap-
plicable to a defendant's right of access to government documents 
for the cross-examination and impeachment of government wit-
nesses. 6 Congress, prompted by misinterpretation and the intru-
sion of the Jencks decision into often totally unrelated areas, 
drafted legislation to clarify and delimit the reach of ]encks.1 
However, it appears that in attempting to reaffirm the Jencks 
rule, Congress passed an act which is not only defective and am-
biguous in some respects, but which is also unduly restrictive, 
for it forecloses access to impeachment materials in situations 
seemingly not contemplated by Congress. The act seeks to es-
tablish a rule governing the production of statements and reports 
of witnesses made to government agents which protects confiden-
tial information in the possession of the government and at the 
same time provides the means for a defendant's presentation of 
an adequate defense during criminal prosecutions. 
In reading the act and the interpretation of it by the Court 
in Palermo v. United States,8 it is questionable whether Congress 
was aware of the fact that, in attempting to remedy the "Roman 
Holiday" referred to in Justice Clark's dissent in ]encks,9 it was 
creating in the act itself several means of evading its requirements 
while at the same time preserving the government's advantage 
6 Prior to Jencks case, the reasoning, based on the Supreme Court's decision in Gor-
don v. United States, 344 U.S. 414 (1953), had been that a foundation of inconsistency was 
necessarily required before the defendant could have access to statements of witnesses. See 
also Herzog v. United States, (9th Cir. 1955) 226 F. (2d) 561, cert. den. 352 U.S. 844 
(1956); Scanlon v. United States, (1st Cir. 1955) 223 F. (2d) 382. Furthermore, the accepted 
practice required production of the requested statements to the trial judge for his in-
spection in camera, with the judge being obligated to turn over to the defendant such por-
tions of the statements as were admissible in evidence for impeachment purposes. See 
United States v. Krulewitch, (2d Cir. 1944) 145 F. (2d) 76; United States C. Cohen, (2d 
Cir. 1944) 145 F. (2d) 82, cert. den. 323 U.S. 799 (1945); United States v. Beekman, (2d Cir. 
1946) 155 F. (2d) 580; United States v. Grayson, (2d Cir. 1948) 166 F. (2d) 863; United 
States v. Mesarosh, (W. D. Pa. 1953) ll6 F. Supp. 345, affd. (3d Cir. 1955) 223 F. (2d) 449, 
revd. on other grounds, 352 U.S. 1 (1956). However, there was a decided lack of harmony 
among the circuits as to the foundation upon which the right to such evidence was based 
as well as to the application of the right itself. See comment, 106 UNIV. PA. L. R.Ev. IIO 
(1957); note, 56 MICH. L. R.Ev. 314 (1957). 
7 For a discussion, see the brief of Senator O'Mahoney, 103 CoNG. REc. 15938-15941 
(1957). See also Keeffe, "Jinks and Jencks," 7 CATH. UNIV. L. R.Ev. 91 (1958); comment, 
67 YALE L.J. 674 at 680-682 (1958). 
8 360 U.S. 343 (1959). 
9 353 U.S. 657 at 681-682 (1957). 
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in using informer reports. For example, in Palermo, the defend-
ant, being prosecuted for criminal tax evasion, requested produc-
tion by the government of a conference memorandum made by 
a government agent. The memorandum, consisting of a 600-
word summary of a conference which had lasted three and one-
half hours, was made up after the conference and represented the 
agent's selection of those items of information deemed appropri-
ate. The trial judge denied production of the memorandum on 
the ground that it was not within the definition of the term 
"statement" in paragraph (e) of the Jencks Act. The defendant 
was convicted, and his conviction was affirmed on appeal.10 On 
certiorari, the Supreme Court unanimously affirmed, with four 
justices concurring in the result only.11 Justice Frankfurter, writ-
ing the opinion of the Court, held that the act was the exclusive 
means of compelling production of statements made by govern-
ment witnesses to agents of the government, and that the court 
below was justified in determining that the memorandum was 
not within the act's definition of "statement." 
No doubt the legislation was intended to limit types of state-
ments and reports a defendant is entitled to examine in a criminal 
suit. But in seeking to implement the principles of the Jencks 
case, has Congress passed legislation invalid in itself? To a great 
extent the answer to this lies in a determination of the true basis of 
the Jencks case.12 To formulate answers to whether the act was 
intended to be exclusive, and, if so, whether it violates the Fifth 
Amendment due process clause or the Sixth Amendment com-
pulsory process and right of confrontation clauses, a consideration 
of the Jencks Act in light of the decision it purported to clarify is 
necessary. 
I. WAS THE JENCKS AcT INTENDED To BE ExcLusrVE? 
The original bills drafted by the Justice Department con-
tained language broad enough to have completely vitiated almost 
every right a defendant might have had to obtain statements and 
10 United States v. Palermo, (2d Cir. 1958) 258 F. (2d) 397. 
11 Justice Brennan, joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black and Douglas, 
concurred in the result only because they felt that the memorandum did not come within 
the term "statement" as defined by paragraph (e) of the Jencks Act. However, they felt 
that the majority decided much more than the situation called for when it extended its 
opinion to the question of the act's exclusivity. See 360 U.S. 343 at 360 (1959). 
12 For articles which take the position that the Jencks case was based on constitutional 
grounds, see Keeffe, "Jinks and Jencks," 7 CATII. UNIV. REv. 91 (1958); comment, 31 So. 
CAL. L. REv. 78 (1957). For articles which take the position that the Jencks case merely sets 
out a rule of criminal procedure, see comment, 106 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 110 (1957). 
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reports of government witnesses in the possession of the govern-
ment. The bills declared: 
"(a) In any criminal prosecution brought by the United 
States, any rule of court or procedure to the contrary notwith-
standing, no statement or report of any . . . person other 
than the defendant which is in the possession of the United 
States shall be the subject of subpoena, discovery, or inspec-
tion, except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section. "13 
Paragraph (b) allowed inspection of statements and reports of 
government witnesses relating to the subject matter to which the 
witness had testified. Certainly this broad language would seem 
to embrace the procedures defined by the federal rules prior to 
the Jencks case as well as the limitations of the Jencks case itself. 
Moreover, when the apparently absolute limitations of paragraph 
(a) were combined with the restrictive definition of "statement" 
in paragraph ( e) of the proposed bills and the final enactment, 
there appeared to be very little left of the original policies and 
purposes of the Jencks case. However, the final enactment was 
not so worded, for the language of the original bills was con-
siderably modified to resemble more closely the Court's decision 
in the Jencks case. Certainly it would seem that the deletion of 
this broad language of exclusivity in conference compels an in-
ference negating absolute exclusivity in the act as passed.14 Clearly 
Congress has not defined all of the possible situations which fall 
outside of the act in which statements would be invaluable to the 
defendant for purposes of cross-examination: for example, where 
the government agent makes use of the reports, but the prosecu-
tion does not call the witness; where a written statement is given 
by the witness yet not signed or otherwise adopted by him; where 
an oral report is summarized substantially verbatim though not 
contemporaneously with the recital of the witness; and where the 
statements would be consistent with the testimony of the witness 
or would not relate to his testimony yet would indicate strong 
bias on the part of the witness.15 In these instances, the unde-
sirability of denying the accused access to such statements on the 
grounds of the exclusivity of the act becomes particularly pro-
nounced if the testimony of the witness is the turning point of 
13 Emphasis added. For the complete text of the bills, see S. Rep. 569, 85th Cong., 1st 
sess., pp. 10-11 (1957), and H. Rep. 700, 85th Cong., 1st sess., p. 15 (1957). 
14 See the concurring opinion of Justice Clark in Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 
343 at 363 (1959). 
15 See comment, 67 YALE L.J. 674 at 693 (1958). 
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the prosecution's case and the basis of guilt or innocence in the 
mind of the jury. 
The Court in Palermo, although admitting that "exclusive-
ness" is nowhere expressed in the act, maintains the somewhat 
dubious theory that, "Some things [exclusivity] too clearly evince 
a legislative enactment to call for a redundancy of utterance."16 
To be sure, the act does not provide for the inspection of un-
authenticated statements or reports or oral statements transcribed 
by a government agent in summary fashion, for the procedure of 
paragraphs (b) and (c) is limited to forms of authenticating 
statements as defined in paragraph (e). However, paragraph (a) 
is not so limited.17 Furthermore, the conspicuous absence of 
the phrase "any rule of court or procedure to the contrary not-
withstanding" in the final enactment, even though a precise stand-
ard of authenticity is required by paragraph (e), should not sug-
gest a similarity of exclusive prohibitory purposes.18 Keeping in 
mind the legislative intent to clarify and reaffirm the Jencks case, 
this reasoning appears even more valid, for certainly the Court in 
Jencks did not limit its ruling to any precise definitions or forms 
of authenticity. 
But even if it is assumed that the act was intended to be exclu-
sive, to what was this exclusivity intended to apply? If the act is 
merely a procedural device for obtaining the types of documents 
within its definition, it does not necessarily follow that the rationale 
of the Jencks case cannot be utilized to obtain those documents that 
fall without the purview of the act.19 It is entirely conceivable that 
;J.6 360 U.S. 343 at 350 (1959). 
17 Interestingly, the word "report" is not mentioned after paragraph (a). Unlike 
the word "statement," the word "report" is not defined. It seems to have been entirely for-
gotten to the point of its not having even been argued in any cases to which paragraph (e) 
has been applied. Apparently the thought must be that the two words are used inter-
changeably despite the use of the disjunctive "or" in paragraph (a). But it certainly seems 
that the possible distinction ought to be argued. 
18 Congressman Celler stated: "The proposed legislation is not designed to touch in 
any way the decision of the Supreme Court insofar as due process :is concerned. It seeks 
only to set up a procedural device for the setting up of standards of interpretation for 
safeguarding the needless disclosure of confidential information in Government files and, 
at the same time, assuring defendants access to the material in those files pertinent to the 
testimony of the Government witness .•.. [W]e are simply attempting to provide a pro-
cedural process. In doing so, this procedure concerns itself with and limits itself to those 
kinds of statements, documents, and so forth." 103 CONG. R.Ec. 16738 (1957). 
"It is the specific intent of the bill to provide for the production only of written 
statements previously made by a Government witness in the possession of the United States 
which are signed by him or otherwise adopted or approved by him, and any transcription 
or recordings of oral statements made by the witness to a Federal law officer, relating to the 
matter as to which the witness has testified." S. Rep. 981, 85th Cong., 1st sess., p. 3 (1957). 
This does not suggest that exclusiveness should extend beyond the limitations of the act. 
19 See comment, 31 So. CAL. L. REv. 78 at 86 (1957). 
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the act is merely the exclusive method for obtaining "statements" 
within its definition. Certainly the act does not purport to sup-
plant discovery under rules 16 and 17 (c) of the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure.20 In fact, reference to these rules was ex-
pressly made in the early drafts of the bill,21 but was omitted from 
the act as adopted in order to preclude any thoughts that the act 
was intended to modify or reduce their use.22 Thus, since Congress 
intended the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to remain ap-
plicable in situations covered by the rules and not by the Jencks 
Act, there seems to be no reason militating against concluding 
similarly that because the rule set forth in the Jencks case is broad-
er than that prescribed by the act, the Jencks case should control in 
those situations not provided for in the act. 
II. THE JENCKS AcT AND THE SIXTH AMENDMENT 
Assuming arguendo that the Jencks Act is exclusive not only 
as to statements and reports that fall within its definition but as 
to that information outside of its specific words as well, it is ques-
tionable whether the act satisfies the dictates of the Sixth Amend-
ment. 
As necessary and desirable as constitutional flexibility is, the 
inevitable effect is the element of uncertainty. But whatever the 
reaches of uncertainty are, the right to cross-examine, whether de-
fined as a rule of evidence or stated in principles of constitutional 
law, has been firmly embedded in our judicial system. Of course, 
20 "Upon motion of a defendant at any time after the filing of the indictment or in-
formation, the court may order the attorney for the government to permit the defendant 
to inspect and copy or photograph designated books, papers, documents or tangible 
objects, obtained from or belonging to the defendant or obtained from others by seizure or 
by process, upon a showing that the items sought may be material to the preparation of 
his defense and that the request is reasonable .••. " Rule 16, Fed. Rules Crim. Proc., 
18 U.S.C. App. (1958). 
"A subpoena may also command the person to whom it is directed to produce the 
books, papers, documents or other objects designated therein. . • . The court may 
direct that books, papers, documents or objects designated in the subpoena be produced 
before the court at a time prior to the trial or prior to the time when they are to be 
offered in evidence and may upon their production permit the books, papers, documents 
or objects or portions thereof to be inspected by the parties and their attorneys." Id., Rule 
17 (c). 
For a very thorough discussion of the operation of rule 16 and rule 17 (c), see Orfield, 
"Discovery and Inspection in Federal Criminal Procedure," 59 VA. L. R.Ev. 221, 312 (1957). 
The Supreme Court has read into rule 17 (c) the requirement that the materials designated 
in the subpoena be evidentiary, i.e., "admissible in evidence." Bowman Dairy Co. v. United 
States, 341 U.S. 214 at 221 (1951) (dictum); note, 67 HARv. L. R.Ev. 492 (1954). 
21 See 103 CoNG. REc. 16130 (1957). 
22 See discussion in Keeffe, "Jinks and Jencks," 7 CAra. UNIV. L. R.Ev. 91 (1958); 
comment, 67 YALE L.J. 674 (1958). 
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there are many instances when practical necessity justifies modifica-
tion of the right of cross-examination, but even these departures 
are permitted only to the extent they promote fairness to the ac-
cused rather than prejudice his rights.23 
Dean Wigmore has defined the right of confrontation as the 
indispensable opportunity to cross-examine, and in stating its 
essentiality in the most positive and absolute of terms has said, 
". . . [I] t is beyond any doubt the greatest _legal engine 
ever invented for the discovery of truth. . . . If we omit 
political considerations of broader range, then cross-exam-
ination, not trial by jury, is the great and permanent contribu-
tion of the Anglo-American system of law to improved 
methods of trial-procedure.24 
"In short, however radically the jury-trial rules of Evi-
dence may be dispensed with, [ the right of cross-examination] 
... remains as a fundamental of fair and intelligent investi-
gation of disputed facts."25 
The need for the constitutional inquiry is raised forcefully by the 
suggestion of these words that the right of cross-examination is part 
of that "fundamental fairness" essential to a fair trial. If the effect 
of the exclusive application of the Jencks Act is such that it hampers 
the accused in his defense by denying him access to prior incon-
sistent statements related to the testimony of an actual witness in 
order to cross-examine effectively, then the act may well be violative 
of the Sixth Amendment.26 In the Palermo case, Justice Brennan, 
in his concurring opinion, pointed out the fact that a statute which 
restrains the trial judge from ordering the production of such 
statements as might aid the defendant raises an obvious threat of 
deprival of the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation.27 
In the Jencks case, the Court ruled that to require the accused 
to establish an inconsistency between the testimony of a witness 
at the trial and his extrajudicial statements to government agents 
before the accused is allowed access to the statements would be to 
deny him evidence relevant to his defense.28 This latter phrase, 
"evidence relevant to his defense," was used in prior decisions 
23See 5 W1GMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §1401 (1940) . 
.24 Id., § 1367. 
25 Id., §1400. 
26 See the discussion in United States v. Burr, (C.C. Va. 1807) 25 Fed. Cas. 187 at 193. 
Although the case dealt with the production of a letter used by a witness to refresh his 
recollection, the policies announced by the court are applicable here. 
27 See the concurring opinion of Justice Brennan, 360 U.S. 345 at 363 (1959). 
28 353 U.S. 657 at 667 (1957). 
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when questions of Sixth Amendment violations were raised.29 In 
United States v. Schneiderman,30 the court in effect held that re-
ports used to test the credibility of witnesses in reality become wit-
nesses in the defendant's favor. In that case the government 
claimed privilege under a Department of Justice order which 
classified reports of witnesses as confidential, thereby precluding 
their disclosure for any purpose whatsoever. Nevertheless, the 
court compelled production and justified its decision on Sixth 
Amendment grounds.31 The Court in Jencks, citing Schneiderman 
in footnote 13 of its opinion,32 reasoned similarly when it said that 
the Attorney General labors under a duty to see that "justice be 
done." The Court's opinion, moreover, embodied the Schneider-
man rationale that to that end the Attorney General may not with-
hold "evidence essential to the proper disposition of the case, in-
cluding, a fortiori, any evidence which may be material to the 
defense of the accused. "33 In view of the fact that the withholding 
by the Department of Justice has raised questions of Sixth Amend-
ment violations, it would be fair to assume that a legislative pro-
cedural rule which precludes disclosure of an unsigned written 
statement or of an oral statement recorded substantially verbatim, 
though not contemporaneously with its recital, could not accom-
plish what the Attorney General or the Department of Justice 
order could not accomplish constitutionally.34 
29 E.g., United States v. Schneiderman, (S.D. Cal. 1952) 106 F. Supp. 731; United States 
v. Coplon, (2d Cir. 1950) 185 F. (2d) 629. See also Eagleton, "A State Prosecutor Looks at 
the Jencks Case," 4 ST. Louis UNIV. L.J. 405 (1957). 
30 (S.D. Cal. 1952) 106 F. Supp. 731. Defendants, indicted under the Smith Act for 
conspiring to commit offenses against the United States, sought an order directing the 
government to produce for inspection and use by the defense on cross-examination of 
government witnesses certain reports made by those witnesses to the F.B.I. The govern-
ment asserted a claim of privilege. The district court held that any privilege on the part 
of the government to withhold the reports from inspection had been waived by the 
government by questions asked by it on direct examination of the witnesses. While the 
interpretation might be considered rather tenuous, it nevertheless seems that the court 
equated reports and witnesses. 
31 Id. at 736. 
32 353 U.S. 657 at 668 (1957). 
33 United States v. Schneiderman, (S.D. Cal. 1952) 106 F. Supp. 731 at 739. And see 
Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 at 668, n. 13, citing Canon 5, A.B.A., CANONS OF PRO-
FESSIONAL ETHICS (1947) ["The primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public prosecution is 
not to convict, but to see that justice is done. The suppression of facts or the secreting of 
witnesses capable of establishing the innocence of the accused is highly reprehensible." 
Thus, it would seem that if the government is aware of the inconsistency it is under a duty 
to disclose to and provide the defendant with the material necessary to reveal the incon-
sistency.] See also Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 at 88 (1934). 
34 See comment, 31 So. CAL. L. REv. 78 (1957). 
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In United States v. Coplon,35 the Second Circuit stated that 
when the government chooses to prosecute an individual, the right 
of that individual to meet the charges against him by introducing 
relevant documents to his defense cannot be subject to the con-
trol and caprice of the government. The court reasoned that 
whenever the government claim of privilege conflicts with the 
right of the accused "to have compulsory process [ and other evi-
dence] in his favor," the Attorney General must decide whether 
the public prejudice of allowing the crime to go unpunished is 
greater than the attendant public prejudice in disclosing confi-
dential information in the possession of the government which 
might be relevant to the defense.36 
In the Coplon case, the prosecution argued that the government 
privilege precluded disclosure of informer statements and state 
secrets. And it must be recognized that traditionally there is a gov-
ernment privilege in this area. However, it would seem that the 
arguments for government privilege and the limitations on right of 
access should apply with even less vigor than in Coplon to the situa-
tions under discussion here. Since the Jencks Act establishes a rule 
concerning information already disclosed by government witnesses 
during the course of the trial, a situation calling for the production 
of state secrets rarely, if ever, will arise. Thus, when the basis for 
secrecy is removed or when none exists initially, there should be no 
reason operating against disclosure directly to the defendant.37 
If the identity of the witness is known, if the government uses his 
statements as a basis for prosecution, or if the informer testifies at 
the trial concerning those same statements, the suppression of pos-
sible exculpatory statements seems illogical.38 On the other hand, 
the extrajudicial statements may be highly relevant to the defense 
and, consequently, the disposition to disclose these statements 
35 (2d Cir. 1950) 185 F. (2d) 629. 
36 Id. at 638. See also United States v. Burr, (C.C. Va. 1807) 25 Fed. Cas. 187. Chief 
Justice Marshall stated at 191-193: " ... Let it be supposed that the letter may not contain 
anything respecting the person now before the court. Still it may respect a witness material 
in the case, and become important by bearing on his testimony. Different representations 
may have been made by that witness, or his conduct may have been such as to affect his 
testimony. In various modes a paper may bear upon the case, although before the case be 
opened its particular application cannot be perceived by the judge." Commenting on the 
Burr case, in the Jencks decision, Justice Brennan remarked at 353 U.S. 669, n. 14 (1957): 
"\\7hat is true before the case is opened is equally true as it unfolds. The trial judge can-
not perceive or determine the relevancy and materiality of the documents to the defense 
without hearing defense argument, after inspection, as to its bearing upon the case." 
37 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §2374, p. 755 (1940). See also comment, 11 STAN. L. 
REv. 297 at 306 (1959). For an excellent discussion of the use of informer testimony, see, 
generally, comment, 63 YALE L.J. 206 (1953). 
38 Ibid. 
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ought to be heightened notwithstanding their failure to conform 
to paragraph (e)'s definition of "statement." Moreover, to allow 
technical rules of rather dubious merit to prohibit impeachment 
through cross-examination may, in the absence of other means of 
attacking their credibility, allow convictions to be based on the 
untested and unsupported recollections of informers, a class of wit-
nesses whose very livelihood, in many cases, depends on the accept-
ance of their testimony. As a very minimal requirement, the cred-
ibility of such witnesses ought to be subjected to the severest 
scrutiny.89 
In Riser v. Teets,4° although the error was held not to be prej-
udicial since the remainder of the evidence was overwhelming, 
the court nevertheless stated that it was error to refuse to furnish 
copies of prior inconsistent statements of witnesses to the defend-
ant. However, the dissent deemed the error prejudicial in that 
there could be no compromise with a constitutional right, and 
stated, ". . . a right of an accused to have compulsory process 
for obtaining witnesses in his favor is also a right implicit in the 
concept of ordered liberty .... [It] extends to documentary as 
well as oral evidence. . . . [T]he vacating of the subpoena for the 
production of the statements of these witnesses was a plain denial 
of this due process. "41 
Congress, in addition to the courts in these three cases, recog-
nized the use of either the compulsory process or right of confron-
tation clauses of the Sixth Amendment to justify providing the 
defendant with the statements of witnesses and other evidence rele-
vant to his defense. The legislative history of the Jencks Act reveals 
the serious doubts of some of the legislators as to the constitu-
tionality of exclusionary provisions which turn on form rather than 
substance. Senator J avits remarked that the constitutional man-
dates cannot be avoided so easily by a witness simply not signing a 
statement: if a report of a witness is sufficient to impeach that 
witness, the defendant is entitled to use it whether written or 
not.42 And certainly it would seem that the senator's reasoning 
embodies a logical appreciation of the problems raised by the act. 
89 See comment, 31 So. CAL. L. R.Ev. 78 at 82 (1957). 
40 (9th Cir. 1958) 253 F. (2d) 844. 
41 Id. at 847 (dissent). 
42103 CONG. R.Ec. 15933-15934 (1957). Senator Javits also stated: "Certainly we can-
not repeal or change the due process clause; nor do we wish to do so. Within the limits of 
the Constitution we are trying to protect the F.B.I. files .••• The bill is designed to pro-
tect, and does protect, the F.B.I. files to the full extent they ought to be protected, con• 
sistent with the right of the individual to due process •••• " 
898 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [ Vol. 58 
If the unsigned statement used to impeach the witness is not that 
of the witness, then it can be so explained. And if the unsigned 
statement is that of the witness, and the witness denies making it, 
then it would seem that its direct relevance to the issues of the 
case would permit the defendant to have the government agent 
verify its authenticity. But to prohibit altogether access to material 
of impeachment value would be to deny the constitutional right 
to cross-examine effectively. With respect to impeachment, the 
defendant would be in no better position, as a practical matter, than 
if the witness remained anonymous, or the entire proceeding was 
ex parte with the government submitting its arguments while the 
accused submitted none.43 The denial of the available material 
and effective sources from which to cross-examine, seemingly pos-
sible under the Jencks Act, is practically tantamount to the denial 
of cross-examination itself. 
III. THE JENCKS AcT AND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 
Continuing, as in the above discussion, the assumption of the 
exclusiveness of the act, it is relevant also to question the act from 
the standpoint of the fair trial requirements of the Fifth Amend-
ment due process clause. To appraise the act properly in this 
respect, it is first necessary to place it more specifically in a context 
of the Jencks case. The majority opinion in Jencks skillfully 
avoided any reference to the Constitution. But the conspicuous 
absence of the phrase "due process of law" in the opinion might 
well have been due to the exercise of judicial self-restraint, since 
the holding was necessarily based on other grounds.44 Even though 
the Court was in many respects without precedent, the opinion 
seems sufficiently broad to indicate that constitutional mandates 
at least provided a guide.45 Moreover, the conclusion is inescap-
able that the Court by-passed the narrow grounds of the appeal 
in order to deal with the more significant issue of the demands of 
43 See, generally, Mulvaney, "Government Secrecy and the Right of Confrontation," 
31 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 602 (1956). 
44 The opinion is outwardy based upon error of the lower court in denying the motion 
for inspection. Considering the government's sole ground of objection, that a preliminary 
foundation of inconsistency was not laid between the contents of the reports and the testi-
mony of the witness, and upon which ground the court of appeals affirmed, the Supreme 
Court holds this as error, since for production purposes it need appear only that the evi-
dence is relevant, competent and outside the exclusionary rule. The Court held only that 
the trial court and the appellate court erred. No expression was made that this was error 
because the defendant, under the Fifth Amendment, had a right of inspection. 
45 See concurring opinion of Justice Clark in Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343 at 
363 (1959). 
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justice in affording access to government files.46 What, then, 
compels the belief that due process of law was the basis of the 
Court's reasoning in Jencks? 
First, and perhaps the strongest indication, is the language 
of Justice Brennan that, "Justice requires no less."47 This lan-
guage, coupled with the Court's approbation of language in United 
States v. Reynolds,48 strongly suggests due process. Certainly the 
limits of "justice," although insusceptible of precise definition, 
must be moored to some basic structure. Justice in the abstract 
is almost meaningless unless attached to the basic rights which 
dictate it. And, it is indeed arguable that this basic right is that 
of due process of law afforded by the Fifth Amendment. 
Second, it appears that the defendant in the Jencks case could 
not have invoked either rule 16 or 17 (c) of the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, for he sought the production of documents 
within the purview of neither. Rule 16 pertains to documents 
seized or otherwise obtained from the defendant by the govern-
ment, while rule 17 ( c) relates to an expeditious method of requir-
ing production of documents before trial to be used during the 
trial. If, then, there is a right to obtain these documents, it is not 
unreasonable to assume that it arises as an integral part of the 
broader constitutional right to a fair trial. Although its outer 
limits are indefinite, the concept of a fair trial may be defined 
in terms of its recognized elements.49 It would seem that one of 
these elements is the right to cross-examine effectively, for "it is 
unconscionable to allow . . . [ the government] to undertake 
prosecution and then invoke its governmental privileges to deprive 
the accused of anything which might be material to his defense."50 
46 See Eagleton, "A State Prosecutor Looks at the Jencks Case," 4 ST. Louis UNIV. L.J. 
405 (1957). 
47 353 U.S. 657 at 669 (1957). 
48 345 U.S. I at 12 (1952). Chief Justice Vinson stated, "The rationale of the criminal 
cases is that, since the Government which prosecutes an accused also has the duty to see 
that justice is done, it is unconscionable to allow it to undertake prosecution and then 
invoke its governmental privileges to deprive the accused of anything which might be ma-
terial to his defense." 
49 See, generally, Inbau, "The Concept of Fair Hearing in Anglo-American Law," 31 
TULANE L. R.Ev. 67 (1956). 
50 United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. I at 12 (1953) (dictum). See also Roviaro v. 
United States, 353 U.S. 53 at 60 (1957), where the Court said in response to the govern-
ment's seeking to prevent disclosure of informer reports: "A further limitation on the 
applicability of the privilege arises from the fundamental requirements of fairness. Where 
the disclosure of an informer's identity, or of the contents of his communication, is rele-
vant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is essential to a fair determination of a 
cause, the privilege must give way." And in United States v. Beekman, (2d Cir. 1946) 
155 F. (2d) 580 at 584, Judge Frank said: "We have recently held that when the Govern-
ment institutes criminal proceedings in which evidence, otherwise privileged under a statute 
or regulation, becomes importantly relevant, it abandons the privilege." 
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Third, to erect procedural barriers to obstruct the defendant's 
access to materials which might lead to his exculpation would be 
inconsistent with the basic philosophy of giving all possible pro-
tection to the innocent. "As applied to a criminal trial, denial of 
due process is the failure to observe that fundamental fairness 
essential to the very concept of justice. In order to declare a denial 
of it [the court] must find that the absence of that fairness fatally 
infected the trial; the acts complained of must be of such a quality 
as necessarily prevent a fair trial."51 It would seem that "funda-
mental fairness" would require making readily available material 
needed to impeach a witness and perhaps to exculpate a defendant. 
Moreover, a procedural form of suppression would be "fatally in-
fectious" to the point of preventing a "fair trial." Although a 
witness' testimony need not necessarily be perjured, or known to 
be so, a procedural suppression of invaluable impeachment in-
formation would seem similar to the intentional suppression of 
evidence which would refute testimony known to be perjured, a 
practice which has been held to be a violation of due process.5! 
In both instances, it would seem that neither the perjury or its 
possibility, nor the knowledge of the prosecution, is the greater 
wrong. Rather, the greater and more infectious wrong is the sup-
pression, and therefore the same reasoning should be opposed to 
procedural suppression. 
Assuming that the requirements of due process are the basis 
for the Jencks decision, an examination of the act reveals a definite 
delimitation of, if not an actual derogation from, the decision. 
Three specific examples point out the extent of the encroachment 
by the act into the principles enunciated by the Jencks case. 
First, although the Court was without judicial precedent,53 
the in camera inspection provided for in paragraph (c) of the act 
is precisely the practice disapproved of in Jencks, for the Court 
reasoned that only the defendant was adequately equipped to 
determine the need for and the effective use of prior inconsistent 
statements for impeachment purposes, and thus production must 
be directly to the defendant.54 Under the act, however, since the 
51 Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 at 236 (1941). 
52 Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935). Factually the Mooney case can be dis-
tinguished from the Jencks case since in Jencks no perjury was known to exist, and there 
was no intentional suppression of evidence by the prosecution. However, the fact that 
perjury is not known to exist does not mean that it does not exist in fact. Further, there 
need be no intentional suppression by the prosecution if the procedural rules accomplish 
the same thing. 
53 See note 6 supra. 
54 353 U.S. 657 at 669 (1957). See comment, 11 STAN. L. REv. 297 at 301-308 (1959). 
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accused or his attorney will not be present when the inspection is 
made and will not know the contents of the reports, it will be 
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to make a meaningful objec-
tion to the determination of the trial judge. A fortiori an appellate 
review will have the same defect, because the ability of the accused 
to make an effective argument is necessarily dependent on his 
knowledge of the contents of the reports. While it is true that the 
Jencks rule evolved from a balancing of the government's interests 
in secrecy against the interests of the defendant in material relevant 
to his defense,55 the essentiality of the evidence raises a question of 
degree only, while reason should dictate that production should be 
to the defendant in the first instance. 
Second, the Court in Jencks made no distinction as to the form 
of statements given by the witness to the government agent. Yet 
paragraph (e) of the act reveals a studious attempt to crystallize 
all possibilities into a rather inflexible definition. In practice, it 
is not only conceivable but it is probably to be expected that more 
and more interviewers will take advantage of the loopholes in the 
act by putting the interview into the words of the interviewer, as 
was done in Palermo. As a result, the ability to impeach the wit-
ness will be defeated by a requirement based on technicalities of 
form rather than on substance. Clearly this is contrary to the in-
tent of the Court in the Jencks case, because the Court made no 
such distinctions and drew no such fine lines. Rather the Court 
dealt merely with the production of relevant information.56 To 
reason, as did the appellate court in Palermo, that the memoran-
dum was not intended to be substantially verbatim of anything 
recited by the witness57 is to reason erroneously, for the intent of 
the recorder has little, if any, bearing on the issue of the substance 
of the report. The essential requirement for production ought 
not to be the form in which the witness's words are recorded or the 
intent of the recorder, but rather that the report contains the prior 
extrajudicial inconsistent statements sought by the defendant.58 
If the memorandum contains only one substantially-verbatim sen-
tence out of hundreds, this does not mean that the value of that 
one sentence for impeachment would be lessened. In the Palermo 
case, the 600-word memorandum might have been a substantially-
verbatim summary of all the statements needed for impeachment 
55 See note, 18 LA. L. R.Ev. 345 (1958). 
56 353 U.S. 657 at 672 (1957). 
57 United States v. Palermo, (2d Cir. 1958) 258 F. (2d) 397 at 399. 
58 See comment, 34 IND. L.J. 441 at 442, n. 11 (1959). 
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purposes and, further, it might have been a substantial recorda-
tion of all the material related to that matter testified to at the 
trial. However, since the 600 words were not a substantially-ver-
batim transcription of the entire interview, they would not come 
within the definition in paragraph (e) of the act. Yet no one could 
dispute the fact that their quality for impeachment purposes would 
be no greater if the whole interview had been recorded. 
Thus, it would seem that if the Jencks case sets forth a rule of 
procedural due process, the Jencks Act has truly departed from the 
spirit of that decision59 and would therefore be repugnant to the 
Fifth Amendment. Even if the Court in the Jencks case based 
its decision solely on its common-law power to administer pro-
cedural and evidentiary rules for the federal courts, 60 rather than on 
constitutional grounds, it is certainly arguable that through legis-
lation, Congress, by according the defendant so much less than 
did the Court in Jencks, lessened his rights to such an extent that 
the act itself is a violation of due process. Since the requirements 
of due process of law serve as a restraint on congressional as well 
as judicial powers, Congress is not free to make whatever procedure 
it wishes "due process of law."61 In striving to dispense justice in 
criminal proceedings, the means by which the justice is to be 
achieved must be considered as vital and significant as the justice 
itself. Procedural due process requires that the rules conform to a 
sound conception of the protective devices of the Constitution, not 
that the concept of due process be altered and molded to conform 
59 Another departure may perhaps be found in the fact that the procedure provided 
for in paragraph (d) of the act differs markedly from the procedure outlined in the Jencks 
case. The Court there adopted, without modification, the portions of the Reynolds opinion 
to the effect that in criminal cases the government can invoke its evidentiary privilege only 
at the expense of letting the defendant go free. 353 U.S. 657 at 671 (1957). And see notes 
48 and 50 supra. See also Schwartz, "Jencks-An Unveiling Pattern of Expanding Federal 
Criminal Discovery," 3 So. TEX. L.J. 111 at 139 (1957). 
60 See Scales v. United States, (4th Cir. 1958) 260 F. (2d) 21, cert. granted 358 U.S. 917 
(1958); United States v. Spangelet, (2d Cir. 1958) 258 F. (2d) 338; United States v. Angelet, 
(2d Cir. 1958) 255 F. (2d) 383. See also McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 at 341 
(1943), where the Court said: "In the exercise of its supervisory authority over the admin-
istration of criminal justice in the federal courts ••• this Court has, from the very begin-
ning of its history, formulated rules of evidence to be applied in federal criminal prosecu-
tions." 
61 Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land and Improvement Co., 18 How. (59 U.S.) 272 
at 276-277 (1855): "The constitution contains no description of those processes which it 
was intended to allow or forbid. It does not even declare what principles are to be ap-
plied to ascertain whether it be due process. It is manifest that it was not left to the legis-
lative power to enact any process which might be devised. The article is a restraint on 
the legislative as well as on the executive and judicial powers of the government, and can-
. not be so construed as to leave congress free to make any process 'due process of law,' by 
its mere will." 
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to the rules.62 To be sure, the history of the act indicates a con-
gressional awareness of this, for the legislators continually referred 
to their duty to afford due process of law.63 But awareness of a duty 
and the discharge of that duty are two different things. Undoubted-
ly many of the inconsistencies between the act and the Jencks case 
were generated by the desire to legislate in this area before the im-
pending recess.64 However, this explanation offers little solace to 
an accused. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The general gravity and stigma of a criminal prosecution 
should not be treated so lightly as to withdraw access to possible 
exculpatory statements on so restrictive a definition as that found 
in the act. If the theories of the prosecution in any given case are 
correct, then certainly no prejudice will result from disclosure of 
the statements, since only the statements related to matters testi-
fied to will be involved. And if the theories of the prosecution are 
incorrect, then any prejudice to the government resulting from 
disclosure would be justified. The cases in which the Jencks rule 
was applied, 65 though not always satisfactorily or rationally, would 
still seem indicative of a general tendency to attach greater signifi-
cance to the basic rights propounded in the Jencks case than Con-
gress appears to have recognized in its enactment. 
The constitutional questions raised by the application of the 
act are probably due more to the label of "exclusivity" attached 
by the Court in the Palermo case than to any one other single fac-
tor. Although the judiciary's duty to bridge the gaps in statutes 
in order to formulate purposes and policies is often unavoidable, 
the task is a dangerous one, to be approached with extreme cau-
tion. 66 It is questionable whether the admonitory dictum of the 
Court in Palermo resulted from the exercise of such caution. In 
view of the basic rights the Court endorsed in the Jencks case, the 
62Jbid. 
63 See, e.g., 103 CONG. REc. 15915, 15916, 15932 (remarks of Senator O'Mahoney), 
16489 (remarks of Senator Cooper) (1957). 
64The principal discussion started in the Senate on Friday, August 23, 1957, 103 CoNG. 
REc. 15781-15792 (1957); was resumed on Monday, August 26, 1957, id. at 15915-15942; 
then shifted to the House on Tuesday, August 27, 1957, id. at 16084, 16113-16130. On 
Thursday, August 29, 1957, the Senate passed the Conference bill, id. at 16486, and on 
Friday, August 30, 1957, the House passed it, id. at 16734. 
65 See cases discussed in the brief of Senator O'Mahoney, 103 CONG. REc. 15938-15941 
(1957). 
66 See, generally, Horack, "Cooperative Action for Improved Statutory Interpretation," 
3 VAND. L. REv. 382 (1950). See also Frankfurter, "Foreword" to "A Symposium on 
Statutory Construction," 3 VAND. L. REv. 365 (1950). 
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conclusion would seem even more compelling that the Court's 
interstitial exercise of a limited legislative function in Palermo was 
unwarranted. If "exclusivity" is to remain the only construction, 
then it appears that the need for an amendment to the act is an 
essential one - perhaps more essential than the need for the passage 
of the act in the first instance. 
Robert ]. Margolin, S.Ed. 
APPENDIX 
THE JENCKS A<::r 
[18 U.S. C. (1958) §3500] 
" (a) In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States, no statement or re• 
port in the possession of the United States which was made by a Government witness or 
prospective Government witness (other than the defendant) to an agent of the Govern• 
ment shall be subject of subpena, discovery, or inspection until said witness has testified 
on direct examination in the trial of the case. 
"(b) After a witness called by the United States, has testified on direct examination, 
the court shall, on motion of the defendant, order the United States to produce any state• 
ment (as hereinafter defined) of the witness in the possession of the United States which 
relates to the subject matter as to which the witness has testified. If the entire contents of 
any such statement relate to the subject matter of the testimony of the witness, the court 
shall order it to be delivered directly to the defendant for his examination and use. 
"(c) If the United States claims that any statement ordered to be produced under 
this section contains matter which does not relate to the subject matter of the testimony 
of the witness, the court shall order the United States to deliver such statement for the 
inspection of the court in camera. Upon such delivery the court shall excise the por-
tions of such statement which do not relate to the subject matter of the testimony of the 
witness. With such material excised, the court shall then direct delivery of such statement 
to the defendant for his use. If, pursuant to such procedure, any portion of such state-
ment is withheld from the defendant and the defendant objects to such withholding, and 
the trial is continued to an adjudication of the guilt of the defendant, the entire text of 
such statement shall be preserved by the United States and, in the event the defendant 
appeals, shall be made available to the appellate court for the purpose of determining the 
correctness of the ruling of the trial judge. Whenever any statement is delivered to a 
defendant pursuant to this section, the court in its discretion, upon application of said 
defendant, may recess proceedings in the trial for such time as it may determine to be 
reasonably required for the examination of such statement by said defendant and his 
preparation for its use in the trial. 
"(d) If the United States elects not to comply with an order of the court under 
paragraph (b) or (c) hereof to deliver to the defendant any such statement, or such 
portion thereof as the court may direct, the court shall strike from the reoord the testi-
mony of the witness, and the trial shall proceed unless the oourt in its discretion shall 
determine that the interests of justice require that a mistrial be declared. 
"(e) The term 'statement,' as used in subsections (b), (c), and (d) of this section 
in relation to any witness called by the United States, means -
" (1) a written statement made by said witness and signed or otherwise adopted or 
approved by him; or 
" (2) a stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or other recording, or a transcription 
thereof, which is a substantially verbatim recital of an oral statement made by said wit-
ness to an agent of the Government and recorded contemporaneously with the making of 
such oral statement." 
